(Part I)

 

Decolonization and Independence

By the early 1950s, waves of decolonization and independence rippled across Africa. As early as 1947, the British Labour government had signaled a willingness to divest Britain of most of the empire. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951, they initially slowed this process down. But, in 1960, prime minster Harold Macmillan delivered the famous “winds of change” speech in Cape Town signaling that the Conservatives would no longer oppose decolonization (recording of full speech; pdf of excerpts).

From a British perspective, the independence of its African colonies was a relatively painless affair. This is not to say it was painless for the people of Africa, just that Britain, in general, expended little blood and treasure in the process which led to the independence of almost twenty African states between 1951 and 1970. There were several factors which contributed to this. First, in many of the British colonies, white expats made up a very small part of the population. Most were state officials, teachers, missionaries, or the occasional businessman – rather than farmers. Second, in the handful of British possessions where there was some widespread British expat land-owning, almost all of these were colonies with little or no self-government. Thus, British citizens who lived on land which they or their parents or grandparents had claimed, while certainly of the ruling class, relied on the power of the British state to enforce British law.

So, when British colonies in Africa began to demand independence in the post-war years, for the most part British officials simply became mediators between different factions of locals. This mediation usually meant the British supervised elections and the local white/expat population had almost no say in the trajectory of independence. Regardless of which faction won, there was little immediate effect on the expat population.

In a handful of colonies, where there were extensive white land-holdings, many settlers had to choose between staying and facing a government run by those they had formally held dominion over, or leaving for pastures new (which did not always mean Britain. Many expats ended up in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand). Those who left did not necessarily have to sell their land at fire sale prices. In Kenya, for example, during the brutal Mau mau rebellion and its—equally brutal—repression, many expats decided to leave the country. Most of these sold their landholdings to the new Kenyan government, under the auspices of the World Bank via a plan known as the million-acre scheme (documents released later showed that much of the money the World Bank used to purchase the land had been secretly channeled to it from the UK government).

 

The (southern) Rhodesian Distinctive

The “winds of change” had been much more tranquil in Southern Rhodesia, especially for the white/expat community. The 1920s triumph of the RGA movement meant they controlled far more of the political process than did white and/or expat communities in any other British African colony. As late as 1955, there was still strict segregation throughout the country – a policy that extended even to the parliamentary dining room. Around the same time, a factory manager told a visiting English lord:

I had a friend from Northern Rhodesia [Zambia] down here the other day who said what a relief it was to see a really good flogging again. He told me: “you know up in Northern Rhodesia, if you raise your hand against one of these chaps, he drags you off to the police station.”

Furthermore, expats—and their descendants—owned almost all of the prime farmland. These conditions led, beginning in 1946, to a fresh wave of European—mostly British (including RAF personnel)—immigrants to the country. Almost 90,000 arrived in a five-year period. Although the goal was to bring in skilled workers, their arrival also fueled a demand for land. This almost inevitably led to the displacement of African residents. For example a large ranch known as Rhodesdale, originally owned by a British conglomerate, was purchased by the Southern Rhodesian government after WWII, surveyed, and sold as farms to arriving Europeans. Most of the African farmers who lived on the ranch were forcibly resettled during the surveying process. Those black farmers not resettled during the survey process were usually forcibly resettled after Europeans arrived as the Europeans did not want to share the region with blacks. Keep your mental thumb here, because this is the crucial moment to which I want to return. This forcible resettlement of blacks was encouraged, and enabled, by the government of Southern Rhodesia.

As decolonization accelerated across Africa, the white government of southern Rhodesia first dug in their heels, then came up with their own solution. On November 11, 1965, under the leadership of Ian Smith, southern Rhodesia declared itself independent as the new sovereign state of Rhodesia. The ruling party–the Rhodesian Front–made it clear that it intended to govern along racial lines. Their policies also included maintaining laws which prevented blacks being allowed to purchase land outside strictly demarcated regions. You will not be surprised to learn that the land available to blacks was of marginal utility (Note: I’ve skipped over some policies and factors which ameliorated the racism which permeated southern Rhodesia. Although noteworthy, I’ve decided they weren’t germane to my main point).

Although the British Labour Party—and the Archbishop of Canterbury—suggested that Britain should use military force to bring Rhodesia to heel, the British government opted for economic sanctions. Initially, Rhodesia did OK as an independent state. Exports increased, although there was a decrease in the availability of luxury goods such as brandy and Scotch (which would have broken my resistance). Between 1967 and 1973, a further 39,000 white settlers arrived.

However, beginning in 1977, an increasingly brutal guerilla insurgency broke out. By 1978, health care had collapsed in many areas and most main roads were considered unsafe to travel after dark.

Whites began to leave the country, partly because of fear of the fighting, but also because of the taxes needed to fight the war and increasing efforts to conscript whites to serve in the Rhodesian military.

The war came to an end in 1980 (again, I’m short-changing a lot of stuff here). The peace deal almost fell apart because of bitter disagreements over land reform. But, elections were held in February, 1980, and won by Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. Mugabe’s pre-election rhetoric had suggested a willingness to compromise. In particular, Mugabe sought to mollify white commercial farmers (about 6,000 total) who controlled 40% of agricultural land and two-thirds of the best land. The rest, as they say, is history and need not concern us here.

 

The Resolution Restated: Specific

Again, I want to stress that I come not to praise Mugabe. His approach to land was violent, corrupt, against most economic principles and, dare I say, evil.

 

But, the fact that peace negotiations almost foundered over the land issue tells us how important it was to many Zimbabweans. Remove Mugabe and ZANU-PF from your mental framework, as you consider, dear Glibs, my resolution/question for you:

The Rhodesian Front under RGA, and the independent Rhodesian state through about 1973, used the power of the state apparatus to remove black farmers from arable land and sell it to white farmers, without compensating black farmers. If there had been a democratic transition to power in, say, 1974, would it have been permissible for a black-dominated government (sans Mugabe and ZANU-PF) to remove white farmers from arable land and give/sell it to black farmers without compensating the white farmers?

Importantly, in this hypothetical scenario most of the white farmers and the dispossessed blacks would have still been alive in 1974. In that situation, would you use the power of the state to take land from those who had been sold the land via the power of the state 20-25 years earlier?

Somewhat related music (don’t give up on it too early).